¿Una sabiduría insulsa? Sobre la crítica de Kant al principio aristotélico de la μεσότης
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2002.i27.565Abstract
It is surprising that, in the classification of all material principles of morality proposed by Kant in the Critique of Practical Reason, the celebrated Aristotelian principle of the mesótes does not appear. This omission, not sufficiently explained by scholars and historians of ethics, is based on Kant’s radical rejection of this principle, as it is expounded in passing in the Metaphysics of Morals and in the lectures on ethics. According to Kant’s criticism, the principle of the mesótes is either useless or a mere tautology or a pragmatic, and non-moral, rule. But, as a matter of fact, Kant’s objections rest on a misconception about what Aristotle actually held.
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Published
2002-12-30
How to Cite
Rovira, R. (2002). ¿Una sabiduría insulsa? Sobre la crítica de Kant al principio aristotélico de la μεσότης. Isegoría, (27), 239–249. https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2002.i27.565
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