Arrogance, distrust and disaffection. An approach based on the epistemology of virtue
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2024.70.1348Keywords:
Arrogance, Trust, Disaffection, Epistemology of virtue, Receptive publicsAbstract
Political disaffection can be related to the demonstrated distrust in the most relevant intermediary institutions in representative democracies: political parties and the media. The relative cronification of this distrust can be explained by a widespread subjective disposition of epistemic arrogance and illusory trust, which implies either a resignation or a mistaken use of the criteria for assessing the trustworthiness of the mediations. In order to diagnose the situations and assess possible responses, an analysis based on the theoretical framework of virtue epistemology and systems-based social epistemology is proposed. Against nostalgic exceptionalist narratives about the digitalised society, a constructive line of enquiry will be pointed to the study of forms of re-elaboration of trust that realistically assume the fragmentation of the digitalised public space.
Downloads
References
Alfano, M. (2016). Friendship and the Structure of Trust. En A. Masala y J. Webber (Eds.), From Personality to Virtue (pp. 186-206). Oxford University Press.
Alfano, M., Carter, J. A. y Cheong, M. (2018). Technological Seduction and Self-Radicalization. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 4 (3), 298-322.
Alfano, M. y Skorburg, J. A. (2018). Extended Knowledge, the Recognition Heuristic, and Epistemic Injustice (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press.
Arfini, S. (2019). Ignorant Cognition: A Philosophical Investigation of the Cognitive Features of Not-Knowing. Springer Verlag.
Baehr, J. (2013). Educating for Intellectual Virtues: From Theory to Practice: Educating for Intellectual Virtues. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 47 (2), 248-262.
Boyd, K. (2023). Group Epistemology and Structural Factors in Online Group Polarization. Episteme, 20 (1), 57-72.
Broncano, F. (2019). Puntos ciegos: Ignorancia pública y conocimiento privado. Lengua de Trapo.
Broncano, F. (2020). Conocimiento expropiado: Epistemología política en una democracia radical. Akal.
Cassam, Q. (2019). Conspiracy theories. Polity Press.
De Ridder, J. (2022). Online Illusions of Understanding. Social Epistemology, 1-16.
Dutilh Novaes, C. (2023). The (higher-order) evidential significance of attention and trust — Comments on Levy’s Bad Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology, 36 (4), 792-807.
Fisher, M., Goddu, M. K. y Keil, F. C. (2015). Searching for explanations: How the Internet inflates estimates of internal knowledge. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144 (3), 674-687.
Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. Social Text, (25/26), 56–80.
Frost-Arnold, K. (2016). Social Media, Trust, and the Epistemology of Prejudice. Social Epistemology, 30(5-6), 513-531.
Goldman, A. I. (2001). Experts: Which ones should you trust?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63 (1), 85-110.
Goldman, A. I. (2010). Systems-oriented social epistemology. En Tamar Szabó Gendler y John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 3. (pp. 189-214.). Oxford University Press.
Greco, J. (2003). Knowledge as Credit for True Belief. En M. DePaul y L. Zagzebski (Eds.), Intellectual Virtue (pp. 111-134). Oxford University Press.
Greco, J. (2010). Achieving knowledge: A virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. Cambridge University Press.
Gunn, H. y Lynch, M. P. (2021). The Internet and Epistemic Agency. En J. Lackey (Ed.), Applied Epistemology (pp. 389-409). Oxford University Press.
Habgood-Coote, J. (2019). Towards a Critical Social Epistemology of Social Media. En Jennifer Lackey y Aidan McGlynn (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Habgood-Coote, J., Ashton, N. A. & El Kassar, N., (2024) “Receptive Publics”. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 11: 5.
Hardin, R. (2002). Trust and trustworthiness. Russell Sage Foundation.
Heersmink, R. (2018). A virtue epistemology of the Internet: Search engines, intellectual virtues and education. Social Epistemology, 32(1), 1-12.
Holroyd, J. (2012). Responsibility for Implicit Bias. Journal of Social Philosophy, 43(3), 274-306.
Innerarity, D. (2022). La sociedad del desconocimiento. Galaxia Gutenberg.
Jones, K. (2012). Trustworthiness. Ethics, 123(1), 61-85. https://doi.org/10.1086/667838
Kahneman, D. (2012). Thinking, fast and slow. Penguin Books.
Kelly, T. (2022). Bias: A philosophical study (New edition). Oxford University Press.
Levy, N. (2022). Bad beliefs: Why they happen to good people. Oxford University Press.
Lynch, M. P. (2017). The internet of us: Knowing more and understanding less in the age of big data. W.W. Norton & Company.
Marin, L. y Copeland, S. M. (2022). Self-Trust and Critical Thinking Online: A Relational Account. Social Epistemology, 1-13.
Miller, B. y Record, I. (2013). Justified Belief in a Digital Age: On the Epistemic Implications of Secret Internet Technologies. Episteme, 10(2), 117-134.
Munton, J. (2023). Prejudice as the misattribution of salience. Analytic Philosophy, 64(1), 1-19.
Nguyen, C. T. (2020). Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Episteme, 17(2), 141-161.
Origgi, G. (2004). Is Trust an Epistemological Notion?Episteme, 1(1), 61-72.
Panke, S. y Stephens, J. (2018). Beyond the Echo Chamber: Pedagogical Tools for Civic Engagement Discourse and Reflection. Educational Technology & Society, 21, 248-263.
Pritchard, D. (2014). Knowledge and Understanding. En A. Fairweather (Ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized (vol. 366, pp. 315-327). Springer International Publishing.
Riggs, W. (2007). Why epistemologists are so down on their luck. Synthese, 158(3), 329-344.
Riggs, W. (2009). Two problems of easy credit. Synthese, 169(1), 201-216.
Rini, R. (2017). Fake News and Partisan Epistemology. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 27(S2), 43-64.
Rosanvallon, P. (2015). La Contrademocracia: La política en la era de la desconfianza. Manantial.
Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2022). El desorden político: Democracias sin intermediación. Catarata.
Sunstein, C. R. (2017). #Republic: Divided democracy in the age of social media. Princeton University Press.
Turri, J., Greco, J. y Alfano, M. (s. f.). Virtue Epistemology. En The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/epistemology-virtue/
Velasco Arias, G. (2023). Pensar la polarización. Gedisa.
Woods, J. (2005). “Epistemic Bubbles.” In We Will Show Them: Essays in Honour of Dov Gabbay, edited by Sergei Artemov, Artur d’Avila Garcez, Howard Barringer, Luis C. Lamb, and John Woods, 731–774. London: College Publications.
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2024 Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
© CSIC. Manuscripts published in both the print and online versions of this journal are the property of the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, and quoting this source is a requirement for any partial or full reproduction.
All contents of this electronic edition, except where otherwise noted, are distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence. You may read here the basic information and the legal text of the licence. The indication of the CC BY 4.0 licence must be expressly stated in this way when necessary.
Self-archiving in repositories, personal webpages or similar, of any version other than the final version of the work produced by the publisher, is not allowed.
