Vulnerability as extrinsic dispositional property
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2026.74.1686Keywords:
vulnerability, dispositional property, conceptual analysis, separationist, extrinsic dispositional propertyAbstract
This article develops some elements of the conception of vulnerability as an extrinsic dispositional property. Starting from the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, and the notion of dispositions as tendencies to manifest under certain stimulus conditions, the text argues that vulnerability depends on contextual and institutional relations rather than solely on the ontological features of its bearers. Several components of vulnerability as an extrinsic dispositional property are elaborated: the idea of institutional causal bases to explain how certain dispositions —such as contractual capacity or susceptibility to economic risks— depend on social rules rather than on physical structures, the notion of ‘indeterminacy’ in manifestation circumstances such as economic inflation, and the claim that the concept of vulnerability displays a deeper open texture distinguishing it from other intrinsic dispositions such as fragility. The proposal offers a descriptive and minimally normative conceptual framework that acknowledges the evaluative dimension of the term without presupposing strong objective values.
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