Del silencio de Auschwitz a los silencios de la filosofía

Abstract

The essay proposes a formal approach to the problem of determining the effect that that historical figure of modern absolute political evil referred to as Auschwitz has produced or ought to have produced in the structure of Philosophy. The premise is that Philosophy, faced with that unheard-of challenge of classical rationality, has been left internally conditioned by a tension or an irreductible opposition: between passion of silence and promise of memory, between the allegiance to the testimonies of an irreparable wrong ant the duty of memory, of blessing the ashes. Thus the necessity of a rigorous deconstruction of the idealistic axiomatics of dominant Western rationalism, and the contemplation of new possibilities of philosophically ellaborating silence and evil in the scope of Jewish thought, in dialogue with the Jewish and Christian theology of the Shoah: from Rosenzweig and Scholem to Adorno, Lévinas and Derrida.