Natural equality as the Objective Basis for Moral Judgments: A Consideration of the Irregularity of Sentiments of the Impartial Spectator

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2018.059.06

Keywords:

Smith, Equality, Irregularity of Sentiments, Fortune, Remorse

Abstract


In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith recognizes that in certain occasions even the most impartial of all spectators experience an ‘irregularity of sentiment’ in judging the moral value of an action. An example of this irregularity can be found in cases where, under the influence of fortune, the consequence of the action does not follow directly from the design of the (human) agent. Within this article, the problem presented will be addressed in order to seek the grounds for the validity of the following thesis: the recognition of the natural equality of all moral agents is the objective basis in which all moral judgment must be grounded. Having indicated this, an important question arises: Why does the innocent, who is not unjust but who is the material cause of the factual injury of another, feels a kind of remorse facing the act and somehow feels “guilty”?

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References

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Published

2018-12-30

How to Cite

Ledesma Albornoz, Álvaro. (2018). Natural equality as the Objective Basis for Moral Judgments: A Consideration of the Irregularity of Sentiments of the Impartial Spectator. Isegoría, (59), 469–492. https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2018.059.06

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