El estado de la virtud. Sobre la noción de tolerancia en el liberalismo político de John Rawls

Abstract

This paper approaches the idea of toleration in John Rawls political liberalism. In particular, it is the general theory what is considered, not the application of it to international relations. Enlightening that idea requires to discuss the different meanings of «toleration» as can be distinguish in Rawls liberalism: On the one hand, Rawls relies that those people for whom the political conception of justice is chosen will have the virtue of toleration. This bargaining for that virtue carries citizens duties, as the duty to be reasonable, recognizing the burdens of reason or the duty of civility; obligations that will be briefly examined. On the other hand, toleration appears as a principle of legitimacy in Rawls political liberalism: as a principle that gives us reasons which justify the ends and organization of the basic structure of society. Then, virtue and principle of toleration are complementary but also maintain strained relations. In view of the hierarchy of values that virtue of toleration presupposes, it does not fit appraising that virtue as a basic political one where the principle of toleration rules the foundations of socio-political order.