El dilema del consenso por superposición rawlsiano
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2004.i31.463Abstract
In this paper we present an objection against the idea of overlapping consensus, nuclear to John Rawls political liberalism. The objection can be put in a dilemmatic form: either an overlapping consensus plays no significant role when it comes to justify the two principles of the conception of justice as fairness, or such idea presupposes the acceptation of some traits or concepts particular to a comprehensive liberalism.
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Published
2004-12-30
How to Cite
Vergés Gifra, J. (2004). El dilema del consenso por superposición rawlsiano. Isegoría, (31), 181–189. https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2004.i31.463
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