¿Es posible una razón crítica sin recurso a Ideas Regulativas?. El nexo entre las dimensiones reflexiva y existencial de la crítica de patologías

Abstract

This essay deals with the normative criteria for a «critique of pathologies» within the scope of culture. In the 20^th Century, the dominant doctrine has been the one defended by J. Habermas and K.-O. Apel, according to which «pathological» is defined as a distortion of discursive rationality, the ideal conditions for which are taken to be the «regulative idea» for the critique. The author maintains, first, that the distortions of such a «rationality» can be unmasked by means of a «negative critique», which does not demand resorting to regulative ideas. Second, it is argued that discourse’s «reason» would not be such without a subsoil of pre-reflective existence and that there is a tragic and insuperable tension between both, where such a tension is central to understand social action. Finally, the author will attempt to offer a normative framework for the existential (and negative) critique of pathologies which be opposed to the enlightened critique.