Critique of the Naturalization of Deontologism in Joshua Greene's Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgment
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/Isegoria.2018.058.11Keywords:
Moral Judgment, Deontologism, Neuroethics, Joshua GreeneAbstract
In this paper I propose to question the Joshua Greene’s neuroethical thesis about the essentially emotional character of so-called “deontological moral judgments”. Frist, I focus on the dual process theory of moral judgment and I criticize that they are considered only and mainly intuitive and non reflective. Se condly, I question that the “utilitarian judgment” is linked to mathematical calculation and the deontological judgment is exclusively reduced to non-reflective factor of emotion. The main objection to Greene’s naturalism raised by me is trying to eliminate the philosophical justification about the moral validity defended by Kant’s deontologism; meanwhile Greene reduces “deontological moral judgment” to exclusively psychological and neurophysiological factors associated with emotion.
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