Freedom as the meeting point for building trust in human relationships

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2021.65.09

Keywords:

Trust, Reliability, Rely (trust), Freedom

Abstract


This paper proposes freedom as the condition of possibility for the construction of trust in human relationships. The methodology used is a review of the scientific literature of the most recent moral and political philosophy. As a result of the dialogue between different positions, it is discovered that freedom, despite being present in the act of trust, is forgotten in the discussion around trust, a forgetfulness that has as its main causes the assumption that trust is natural and the confusion between the propensity to trust and the act of trusting. All this leads to proposing an approach of the act of trusting that starts from the freedom of the trustee and the trustor.

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Published

2021-11-23

How to Cite

Vargas-González, C. ., Toro-Jaramillo, I.-D. ., & Toro-Jaramillo, I.-D. . (2021). Freedom as the meeting point for building trust in human relationships. Isegoría, (65), e09. https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2021.65.09

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Articles