Libertad de vivir

Authors

  • Lorenzo Peña Instituto de Filosofía-CSIC
  • Txetxu Ausín Universidad Europea de Madrid

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2002.i27.558

Abstract


There are two sorts of goods and rights; wellbeing rights and freedom rights. The latter may be renounced by the right-holder and enjoin abstention duties (or negative duties) upon other people. Wellbeing rights impose positive duties on other people and may not be relinquished by the right-holder. We claim that life is a freedom right. Therefore, there is in general no duty to live. The gift of life has to be accepted only insomuch as the presumption of future backwards acceptance by our parents was reasonable. When such is not the case, the new-born is entitled to claim that his right not to live was violated and to demand a compensation from any person, barring his or her mother, having causally contributed to his/her birth. We hedge our theory with several qualifications within the framework of a gradualistic approach to rights and duties.

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Published

2002-12-30

How to Cite

Peña, L., & Ausín, T. (2002). Libertad de vivir. Isegoría, (27), 131–149. https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2002.i27.558

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