Emociones responsables

Abstract

A properly moral responsibility is currently distinguished from other uses of this concept. It is orthodox to attribute three traits to moral responsibility: the obligation to answer with reasons, the obligation to compensate for the damage, and the withdrawal of such a responsibility once the retrieval has been paid. It is also fraquently assumed that the analysis of so called moral emotions confirms the validity of the orthodox notion. I maintain that the description of indignation (a caracteristically moral emotion) strongly attacks the orthodox notion. On my view, indignation implies a distinctive notion of responsibility, excluding the second and third traits of the orthodox conception. Moral responsibility is an anomaly of morals. This form of responsibility is highly akin to the one proposed by the Spanish writer Rafael Sánchez Ferlosio in El alma y la vergüenza (Soul and shame, 2000). My revision of moral responsibility is designed to exemplify a conception of morality itself as a set of «anomalies».