Commands and counsels in modern practical philosophy

Abstract

This paper addresses the traditional distinction between commands and advices in modern practical philosophy as doctrine of duties. The distinction plays an essential role in Christian Thomasius’ thought for his differentiation between distinct spheres of practical life, iustum, honestum and decorum, i. e. the spheres of law (iustum), proper ethics (honestum) and incoercible external behaviour – with ethical meaning –, including good manners (decorum). In Kant’s practical philosophy, the distinction between commands and counsels corresponds to the distinction between morality and prudence as pursuit of happiness. Moral life is ruled by moral law and by the idea of duty, that organizes in its own perspective the other aspects of practical activity and the different kinds of duties. As time passed, Kant is more and more interested to the historical realization of morality as Moralisierung through promotion of its external conditions such as pacific coexistence through the juridical law and improvement of intersubjective relations through Zivilisierung and good manners. Kant’s and eighteenth century’s doctrine of duties leave no space for a morality beyond duty as supererogation, a concept that has received a new attention in contemporary moral debate and can still be discussed in a Kantian perspective.