Humanidad por defecto, cooperación por defecto

Rodrigo Alfonso  González Fernández; María Soledad  Krause Muñoz

doi:10.3989/isegoria.2022.67.19

Authors

Rodrigo Alfonso González Fernández Universidad de Chile https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9693-0541
María Soledad Krause Muñoz Universidad Católica de Chile https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4197-8019

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2022.67.19

Keywords:

Default positions, Default humanity, Dualism, Cooperation, Collective intentionality

Abstract

According to John Searle, default positions, i.e., those intelligibility and action presuppositions, are some departing points from which pre-reflective and pragmatic assumptions are made. Postulating such points helps us deal with certain perennial philosophical issues, by leaving them aside. These problems are the existence of the external world, truth and facts, “direct” perception, the meaning of words, and causality. In this article, we argue that those default positions described by Searle constitute a default humanity, and their absence would dehumanize us. This is particularly relevant in a default position: cooperation, which is the basis of collective intentionality and the milestone of human civilization.

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