Presunciones, verdad y normas procesales

Abstract

The aim of this article is threefold: 1) To cast some light on the controversial issue of the “nature” of presumptions in law; to this purpose, showing the gap existing between “is presumable” and “shall be presumed” (or “ought to be presumed”) is the way to adequately individuate the idea of “presumption norms”. 2) Once this idea has been made clear, to show the need to bring, in the analysis of it, the distinction between rules and principles; this allows to distinguish, in turn, between presumption norms which are rules (“presumption rules”) and presumption norms which are principles (“presumption principles”). 3) To try to dissolve, in theoretical terms, the socalled “iuris et de iure presumptions” (or “conclusive presumptions”); to this end, “presumption norms” (which oblige to presume) are distinguished from “presumption-based norms” (which do not oblige to presume).