Justicia distributiva, responsabilidad y compensación
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2002.i27.564Abstract
The distinction drawn by Dworkin between a person and his circumstances has enabled him to found a strong criterion to discriminate what should be compensated from what should not. Criticism to this distinction has revealed an insufficiency which has led me to present a more precise criterion. My criterion is based upon the distinction between potential and full autonomy, so the lack of something that would let an individual reach the level of full autonomy should be compensated. Compensation should be made in terms of minimums, and this criterion could work as a guide to a possible extension of Dworkin’s mechanism of the hypothetical insurance market.
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